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0 Abstract 
Abstract 
Effects of renewable support legislation on electricity prices have been analyzed with a pleth-
ora of models. However, these models neglect at least one of the following aspects which we 
take into account in our analysis: oligopolistic market behavior of dominant firms, emission 
trading, restricted electricity trade and production capacities, and effects on producer prices 
and firm profits. In this paper we use the electricity market model EMELIE and decompose 
the impact of the feed-in of renewable energy in Germany into two effects: a substitution 
effect triggered by the displacement of conventional sources and a permit price effect induced 
via the ETS. We find that the renewable support increases consumer prices slightly by 0.1 
Eurocent/kWh, while the producer price decreases by 0.4 Eurocent/kWh. In addition, emis-
sions from electricity generation in Germany are reduced by 32 Mt CO2, but are hardly altered 
if we consider the European electricity sector in total. Finally, the profits of most firms are 
significantly reduced by the support policy unless the firms combine relatively carbon inten-
sive production equipment with a loose connection to the German grid. 
1 Introduction 
Today, in most of the industrialized countries in the world, renewable energy is supported by 
policy schemes in order to bring this favorable option to the market. Major advantages attrib-
uted to renewable energies include their low carbon emissions and their sustainability when 
compared with fossil sources. Furthermore, renewable energy can enhance security of supply. 
But, with the exception of long established large hydro power, renewable energies come at a 
high price. The hope of the industrial policy makers are that the renewable energy technolo-
gies can break even once they are more developed and the external effects of CO2 emissions 
are priced in. Therefore, in Germany – as in many other European countries – a so called 
feed-in tariff is granted to electricity from certain renewable energy technologies. Addition-
ally, the European Emission Trading System (ETS) has been introduced and creates a price 
for carbon emissions. Both instruments act not independently of each other and the impact of 
this policy mix on the electricity prices are under discussion. Amundsen (2001) investigates 
the interaction of green certificates, which implement a certain renewable energy quota by a 
market system with the ETS in a partial equilibrium model, derives comparative static results 
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and shows that trade in electricity matters for the effects of a tightening of the ETS on green 
certificate prices. Mordhorst (2001) develops a framework in which he analyzes effects of 
internationally tradable green certificates and interactions with an ETS. He finds that in the 
absence of an ETS, international trade in green certificates will be biased towards domestic 
capacity expansion if a national value is attributed to the induced emission reduction. In a 
similar three country model, Mordhorst (2003) analyzes the promotion of renewable energy 
usage by alternative instruments and derives results which suggest that renewable energy 
support schemes are questionable climate policy instruments when an ETS is present. He 
suspects that a coordinated policy would be more efficient, i.e. the ETS should be tightened if 
more renewable electricity is produced. Jensen and Skytte use static models for the analysis of 
the impact of green certificates on electricity prices (2002) and the combination of green cer-
tificates with an ETS when an emission and a renewable energy goal is simultaneously tar-
geted (2003). They find that the effect of a simple green certificate market on electricity 
prices is ambiguous and that the optimal combination of instruments to reach two goals simul-
taneously depends on the cost structures. Recently, Rathmann (2007) used a model for the 
analysis of the support for renewable energy by the German feed-in tariff in order to show 
that it can reduce electricity prices for certain parameter values. Altogether, these models 
neglect at least one of the following aspects which we take into account in our analysis: oli-
gopolistic market behavior of dominant firms, emission trading, restricted electricity trade and 
production capacities, and effects on producer prices and firm profits. We, therefore, apply a 
computable partial equilibrium model with strategic behavior of dominant firms which has 
been developed on the basis of the original model by Kemfert documented in Kemfert (2007). 
Following this model, a whole family of models has been applied, among others, to the analy-
sis of behavioral assumptions and environmental impact, and of environmental impacts of 
demergers (Lise et al. 2006). Two major refinements of the latter model have been achieved 
for the present analysis. On the one hand, the model has been enlarged to cover the complete 
European electricity market while, on the other hand, the impact of the cross subsidy induced 
by the support for renewable energy has been implemented. In the next section, we introduce 
an algebraic formulation of the model which is followed by a description of the data concern-
ing the transmission capacities between countries and the largest players on the electricity 
market in Europe: plant types as well as cost- and emission functions. In section three, we 
present results concerning producer and consumer prices, emissions and the profits of the 
largest fifteen firms in Europe with regard to installed capacity. 
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2 The  Model 
We model the European electricity industry consisting of   conventional electricity producers 
indexed   which in total form the set 
n
i I . Each country r  is member of the set of countries R . 
Each production level   of the firm i corresponds to a cost and emission level according to 




y y c  and  ( )
i i
y y e . The production   of 
each firm is restricted by its installed capacity 
i y
i y and  may be supplied to the home country 




r i i s y
, . To put it differently, we assume that the 
supply of a firm is completely covered by its production. Furthermore, the total electricity 
export from the home country r  to the foreign market  * r , , depends on the price for 
transmission service and is restricted by the transmission restriction 
* ,r r Ex
* ,r r
Ex between the respec-
tive countries. We assume that the market for transmission service clears at the nonnegative 
price for transmission capacity   such that: 
* ,r r τ ( )
* , * , * , r r r r r r
Ex Ex τ ≥  and   for transmis-




σ  is determined on the emission market which 
is restricted by the total emission cap E  and depends on the total demand for emission per-
mits of the electricity sector  () σ E  and of the non electricity sectors that are included in the 
ETS:  . Market clearing on the emission permit market results in  () σ
nely E () ( ) σ σ
nely E E E + =  
and a nonnegative permit price that is set to zero if the market does not clear. The producer 
price of electricity in each country is denoted by  . The consumer price 
r
S P ( )
r r Q P  equals the 
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The problem of firm i can be stated as the following Lagrangian of the Kuhn-Tucker type: 




ir r r i r i i i i i i i r r
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rR rr





=− − − + − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ τ
  ( 1 ) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (1) sums up the revenues from supply in all 
countries, the second term accounts for the production costs, the third for costs of emission 
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permits, and the fourth for the shadow price of the production capacity, while the last sum 
accounts for the transmission costs for the restricted supply in foreign countries. The optimal-
ity conditions to the problem can be summarized in the following way: 







     ,     0
, ≥
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The main driver of the model is the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t. the supply of the firm 




, which is dependent on the assumed market behavior. In our model 
we represent two behavioral assumptions attributed to -firms: price taking behavior of minor 
actors and strategic behavior of dominant firms à la Cournot, giving rise to a situation of im-
perfect competition. We start with the analytically simpler case of price taking behavior. 
The derivative of the problem of the price taking firm w.r.t. supply can be written as: 
() () () () ()
* ,
,
r r i i i i i
r
r
r r r r r
r i
i
y E y C
Q
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Q P Q P
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L
τ κ σ ς − − − − − +
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∂
  ( 2 ) 
Under Cournot behavior of the firms, the effect on the revenue caused by the choice of output 






dP Q ∈=  
and the regional market share of firm i:  , the derivative of the problem (1) w.r.t. the sup-
ply in a Nash equilibrium can be expressed as: 
r i, ϑ
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r r i i i i i
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s
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* * * , ς ϑ .  ( 3 ) 
If we compare the optimality conditions under the Cournot-Nash assumption with those of the 
price taking case, it is apparent that only a term which depends on the market share is added 
                                                                          
2 The residual demand elasticity refers to the demand elasticity after the supply of the price taking firms is sub-
tracted. 
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∈ , known from conventional 
oligopoly models, and a term induced by the feed-in tariff ς  which reduces the mark-up if the 





Q PP Q ϑς − . The latter term results 
from the firms conjecture about a constant output of the rivals in the Nash-equilibrium with 
regard to a marginal change in own output. Consequently, the firm's burden on production 
induced by the feed-in tariff is diminished by an own,- hence total-, output increase. We can 
now represent the complete model with price taking behavior of minor actors and strategic 
behavior of dominant firms à la Cournot. Therefore, we introduce the binary variable   
which is set to zero in the case of price taking firms and to 1 in the case of dominant firms. 
The combined optimality condition for price takers and strategic firms can be expressed as: 
i l
() () () () ()
* ,
,
r r i i i i i
r
r
r r r r r
r i
i
y E y C
Q
Z
Q P Q p
s
L




















* * * , ς ϑ .  ( 4 ) 
3  Data and Calibration 
The model uses extensive data on the ownership and cost structure of the generation equip-
ment of 25 countries connected to the European electricity grid. The relevant transmission 
capacities are estimated from ETSO's indicative net transfer capacities, while the reference 
demand and prices are taken from Eurostat. The permit demand of the non electricity sectors 
are derived from calculation with GTAP-E, Truong (2007). All quantities in the model refer 
to annual values, e.g. electric work per annum. The calibration is achieved by the choice of 
the residual demand elasticity as to replicate the reference values. In the following, the sup-
ply, demand and transmission side of the model are described in greater detail. The supply 
side of the model is represented by a bottom-up approach where generation capacities are 
characterized by the used energy carrier – dammed water, uranium, hard coal, lignite, natural 
gas and heavy oil – and, in case of the thermal power plants, the technology that is applied. 
Altogether the production capacity is represented by ten technology classes as shown in Table 
1. 
  5Discussion Papers   712 
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Table 1:   
Technologies of the conventional power plants in the model 
fuel type plant type efficiency emissions factor variable cost
[kg/kWhel]  [€-cent/kWhel]
uranium small      0,32 0,00 0,66
large 0,34 0,00 0,62
lignite old 0,34 1,00 1,32
new 0,43 0,89 1,05
hard coal old 0,34 0,74 1,59
new 0,43 0,68 1,26
natural gas conventional ~0,38 ~0,52 ~2,76
combined cycle 0,55 0,33 1,91
heavy oil gas turbine 0,33 0,84 2,55
steam turbine 0,38 0,73 2,21
Source: Own calculations based on expert communication.  
 
Power plants that burn solid fossil fuels and nuclear power plants use steam turbines for elec-
tricity generation. These plants are classified into efficiency clusters ranging from 32 percent 
in the case of small nuclear power plants to 43 percent for comparatively new hard coal and 
lignite firing units. Natural gas and heavy oil are used in power plants equipped with gas 
turbines as well as steam turbines. The combination of both technologies – the so called com-
bined cycle gas turbines (CC) – reach the highest efficiencies ranging from 52 to 59 percent 
with an average of about 55 percent. In accordance with these efficiency parameters the vari-
able costs of the technologies range between 0,21 and 1,05 Eurocent/kWh and the specific 
emissions between 0 and 1 kg CO2 per kWh as depicted in Table 1. 
The simulation of strategic behavior demands a detailed assessment of the plant ownership 
structure of the dominant players. Therefore, a database has been constructed mainly on the 
basis of Glückauf (2006) and the research of annual reports. Table 2 summarizes the capaci-
ties that are available for the fifteen largest players and their major foreign subsidiaries based 
on a multiplicative calculation of effective shares in cases where several ownership layers are 
present. Subsequently, we calculated from these figures estimated continuous marginal costs 
and emissions functions for annual electricity supply of the dominant firms and the competi-











,  ( 5 ) 
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Table 2:   
Net capacities [GW] of the fifteen largest firms in Europe 
 [GWel] Hydro Nuclear Coal Gas & Oil Total
EdF (Fr) 6,51 62,96 6,38 6,89 82,75
Enel (It) 2,43 0,00 8,48 22,18 33,09
E.ON (Ger) 1,51 7,64 11,25 5,35 25,75
RWE (Ger) 0,64 3,54 13,07 3,00 20,25
Endesa (Es) 1,95 2,63 6,76 5,97 17,32
International Power (GB) 0,00 0,00 12,16 4,96 17,11
E.ON (GB) 0,00 0,00 8,66 6,53 15,19
Vattenfall (Ger) 0,00 1,42 8,97 2,75 13,14
Vattenfall (S) 6,74 5,12 0,13 0,93 12,91
Iberdrola (ES) 3,78 1,73 0,67 5,84 12,02
British Energy (GB) 0,00 9,28 1,72 0,00 11,00
D.E.I. (Gr) 2,95 0,00 4,72 1,60 9,27
Suez (Be) 0,00 4,68 1,32 3,15 9,14
EnBW/EdF (Ger) 0,43 4,02 3,08 1,48 9,01
Statkraft (Nor) 7,69 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,69
EDP (Pt) 3,03 0,00 1,81 2,04 6,88
FNM (Cz) 0,47 2,34 3,89 0,05 6,75
BOT (Pl) 0,00 0,00 6,30 0,37 6,67
Source: Own calculations based on information from Glückauf (2006) and annual reports.  
 
where 
i y  denotes the maximum annual generation of firm i in country r . The emission func-
tions are closely linked to the production. Each production level of firm i yields in each pe-
riod a unique level of marginal emissions. The marginal emissions function of firm   for 
production in country 
i











.  ( 6 ) 
The values for the parameters of the marginal cost and emission functions of the fifteen larg-
est firms represented in the model are listed in Table 3. The transmission capacities between 
countries are calculated from ETSO (2006) net transfer capacities where summer and winter 
indicative values are equally weighted with half a year in order to receive maximum annual 
transfer capacities and are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 3:   
Parameters of the marginal cost and emission functions of the fifteen largest firms in 
Europe 
abfg
EdF (Fr) 613,8 0,6 0,4 0,0 2,1
Enel (It) 242,3 1,8 0,0 0,6 0,1
E.ON (Ger) 188,7 1,3 0,2 0,5 0,2
RWE (Ger) 149,6 1,5 0,1 0,7 0,1
Endesa (Es) 126,3 1,5 0,1 0,5 0,2
International Power (GB) 124,3 1,8 0,0 0,8 0,1
E.ON (GB) 110,9 1,8 0,0 0,8 0,1
Vattenfall (Ger) 97,6 1,5 0,1 0,8 0,1
Vattenfall (S) 90,7 0,7 0,9 0,2 0,5
Iberdrola (ES) 86,4 1,1 0,3 0,2 0,6
British Energy (GB) 82,2 0,8 0,3 0,1 2,0
D.E.I. (Gr) 68,4 1,2 0,3 0,2 0,5
Suez (Be) 66,4 1,1 0,2 0,6 0,3
EnBW/EdF (Ger) 66,4 1,1 0,2 0,3 0,4
EDP (Pt) 50,0 0,9 0,0 0,4 0,4
FNM (Cz) 49,9 1,1 0,1 0,6 0,3





The parameters of the demand side, reference demand and prices, are average electricity ex-
change3 prices of the year 2006 or are taken from Eurostat (2006) where a fifty percent dis-
count for transmission and distribution services inside the countries is applied to the Eurostat 
final consumer prices. For the calibration of the model the residual demand elasticity 
r ∈  of 











=  is chosen to replicate the 
benchmark values for prices and quantities in Germany under price taking behavior of minor 
actors and strategic behavior of dominant firms à la Cournot. The value for the residual de-
mand elasticity found for a good replication of the benchmark under a assumed permit price 
of 20 Euro per ton of CO2 has been 0.5. 
                                                                          
3 Amsterdam Power Exchange (apx), Amsterdam; Powernext, Paris; European Energy Exchange (EEX), Leipzig; 
Mercado de Electricidad (OMEL), Madrid; NordPool, Oslo. 
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Table 4:   
Transmission capacities [TWh/a] between countries 
from\to Ger FR AT BE Ch Cz DK SE Pl NL ES FI GB
Ger inf 42,0 12,3 30,7 7,0 11,8 3,7 11,8 34,2
FR 20,4 inf 17,7 28,8 11,4 17,5
AT 12,3 inf 10,5 4,8
BE 23,0 inf 19,1
Ch 35,0 20,1 11,8 inf
Cz 16,9 8,8 inf 6,6
DK 15,3 inf 19,2
SE 4,9 16,4 inf 5,0 16,6
Pl 9,6 15,6 1,3 inf






IT 22,1 1,8 25,9









from\to GR HU IT NO PT SK Si EE Lt Lv BG RO
Ger
FR 22,1











GR inf 3,5 4,8
HU inf 3,5 4,4







Lv 8,8 17,5 inf
BG 2,6 inf 7,0
RO 3,3 8,1 inf
Source: Own calculation on the basis of ETSO (2006).  
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Finally, on the market for emission permits, the total supply is fixed by the amount of permits 
that are allocated by the national authorities. As the model is calibrated on values of the year 
2006, the allocation of the first trading period is broken down into annual allocation applies. 
We assume a total allocation for one year to be 2234 million tons of carbon dioxide.4 The 
demand side of the emission market can be broken down into two parts, i.e. the demand of the 
electricity sector which is calculated directly by the EMELIE model, and the demand of the 
non-electricity emission trading sectors. The determination of the non-electricity permit de-
mand simulations based on the GTAP-E model yielded the following permit demand of the 
non-electricity emission trading sector in dependence of the permit price σ : 
() () σ σ ln 35 . 40 1032− =
nely E ,  ( 7 ) 
where the first term on the right hand side is the baseline emissions and the second term 
represents the permit supply curve of the non electricity sector. 
4 Results 
In the following paragraphs, three scenarios under oligopolistic behavior of dominant firms 
are presented. The baseline for 2006, Scenario A, includes a feed-in tariff of the current val-
ues for the year 2006, i.e. 10.3 Eurocent/kWh as in VDN (2006) and an amount of supported 
renewable electricity of 53 TWh as stated by BMU (2007).  
Table 5:   
Effects of the feed-in tariff on prices, supply and emissions 
permit price total supply
€/ton of CO2 TWh
scenario producer consumer Germany Europe
A 4,3 4,8 20 582 302 1230
B 4,5 4,5 20 601 350 1280
C 4,7 4,7 23,1 585 335 1235
electricity prices electricity emissions
cent/kWh Mt CO2
 
In scenario B, we fix the emission price at the level of scenario A and exclude the feed-in in 
order to decompose the isolated electricity market effect with no feed-back of permit prices. 
Finally, we calculated scenario C where no feed-in applies and, due to increased production in 
polluting plants, the permit price is significantly higher compared to scenario A. Table 5 pro-
                                                                          
4 The figure is in line with DEHST (2005) and the information on the internet page of the European Commission 
while taking the the opt-in reserve into account. 
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vides an overview of results. Apparently, the consumer price of electricity increases by only 
0.1 Eurocent/kWh and consequently the total supply in Germany is reduced by only about 3 
TWh. However, the price for emission permits is significantly reduced by the feed-in by about 
3.1 Euro per ton and the producer price for electricity in Germany is also considerably low-
ered. Figure 1 demonstrates the results for the German producers price for electricity in 
greater detail. 
Figure 1:   






































When we move from point C, the situation with out the feed-in tariff, to point A which repre-
sents the current situation, we find a reduction of about 0.4 Eurocent/kWh induced by the 
feed-in tariff. As mentioned, the scenario choice facilitates the decomposition of the total 
effect into two separate effects. A first effect, triggered by the substitution of less expensive 
conventional sources by more expensive renewable energy, termed substitution effect in the 
following. And a second effect, the permit price effect, induced by the drop in permit prices 
σ . The substitution effect itself consists of two components:  
•  Substitution of conventional supply by renewable energy Z  leading to a shift of the dotted 
demand for conventional electricity, 
•  Introduction of a gap between consumer and producer prices which corresponds with a 
downward move on the demand function for conventional electricity. 
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Figure 2:   






































In total, we find that both effects are negative and of the same size, i.e. -0.2 Eurocent/kWh 
each. This is a remarkable result since previous work mostly neglects this effect (Bode 2006). 
In the remainder of the article, we analyze the impact of the feed-in tariff on emissions and 
profits of the electricity sector. In regard to emissions, the picture depends on the scope of the 
analysis. If we focus on Germany, the results are significantly larger than those we get for 
Europe. The overall effect essentially depends on the slope of the permit demand indicated 
with dotted lines in Figure 2 which shows both effects for Germany. In accordance with the 
substitution effect triggered by the introduction of renewable energy, the emission effect of 
the feed-in tariff under constant permit prices is clearly negative – the renewable energy is 
assumed to produce no emission – and of a size of about 48 Megatons of CO2. This effect is 
partially compensated by the reduction of permit prices and the subsequent increase by about 
15 Megatons of CO2 such that the emission reduction in the German electricity sector is only 
about 33 Megatons of CO2 in total. On the contrary, the total sectoral emission in Europe 
decreases by a mere 4 Megatons of CO2. Here, the effect induced by the drop in permit prices 
of 27 Megatons of CO2 almost compensates the effect that is due to substitution of dirty 
sources by renewable sources which sums up to 31 Megatons of CO2. 
Finally, we present the impact of the feed-in on the profit of producers listed in Table 6 be-
low. In the profit column, the profit from the operation of the power plants are given in mil-
lions of Euro annually. It appears that in a liberalized market Eléctricité de France (EdF) 
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clearly has the most profitable generation assets with an annual profit of almost 12 billion 
Euro followed by comparably large companies with low carbon assets like E.ON Germany 
and British Energy with about 3 and 2 billion Euro profit from plant operation respectively. 
These companies are followed by Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou (D.E.I) of Greece, the 
partly EdF controlled Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW) of Germany, Spain's Iberdrola 
and Germany's Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG (RWE) with roughly 1.8, 1.4, 
1.4, and 1.2 billion Euro respectively. These leading companies are followed by companies 
that are either smaller or have a more costly production ranging from Italy's Ente Nazionale 
per l’Energia Elettrica (Enel) with one billion Euro profit to Polish Belchatow, Opole and 
Turow power plants (BOT) with a profit of only about 26 million Euro from plant operation. 
The total effect on the profits of the largest firms that is caused by the German feed-in tariff 
can be detected from the last column in Table 6 and has again been separated into the two 
basic effects caused by substitution of sources and by the change in permit prices. We find 
that the firms are affected differently. On the one hand, firms incur negative or at best zero 
impacts on their profits due to the substitution effect. Here, the German firms are affected the 
most with losses of 126 million Euro for EnBW, 379 million Euro for Vattenfall Germany, 
467 million Euro for RWE and 650 million Euro for E.ON Germany. At the same time, firms 
that are remote to the German market and loosely connected by the electricity grid are not 
affected by a substitution effect like the firms in Great Britain, Spain and Portugal. Contrarily, 
the permit price effects on firms are ambiguous. Clearly, firms with high emission factors like 
RWE, Vattenfall Germany, and Enel benefit the most from a drop in permit prices while firms 
with comparatively low CO2 emissions like EdF, British Energy and E.ON are negatively 
impacted by the permit price decrease: Firms with low emissions lose some of their compara-
tive advantage over dirty firms if the permit price decreases. In regard to the total effect, most 
of the firms are impacted negatively by the feed-in tariff with the exception of firms that are 
comparatively dirty or remotely located to the German market like Enel, E.ON Great Britain, 
Endesa or BOT. 
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Table 6:   
Effects of the German feed-in tariff on European electricity sector profits [million Euro] 
Mio € feed-in no feed-in substitution permit price total
EdF (Fr) 11794     11981 -57 -130 -187
E.ON (Ger) 2918     3596 -650 -27 -677
British Energy (GB) 2100     2204 0 -103 -103
D.E.I. (Gr) 1805     1838 -10 -23 -33
EnBW/Edf (Ger) 1435     1636 -126 -75 -201
Iberdrola (ES) 1381     1377 0 4 4
RWE (Ger) 1171     1527 -467 111 -356
Enel (It) 1046     961 -11 97 86
Vattenfall (S) 984     1006 -11 -12 -23
EDP (Pt) 941     923 0 18 18
Vattenfall (Ger) 748     1024 -379 102 -276
FNM (Cz) 449     498 -37 -12 -49
Endesa (Es) 356     310 0 46 46
Suez (Be) 120     115 -2 7 5
E.ON (GB) 88     60 0 27 27
Interational Power (GB) 49     26 0 23 23
BOT (Pl) 26     14 -9 20 11
profit feed-in effect on profit
 
5 Conclusions 
We investigated effects of the German feed-in tariff with a bottom-up model for the electricity 
market of Europe and analyzed impacts on producer as well as consumer prices, electricity 
sector emissions in Germany and Europe as a whole, and on the firm's profits from plant op-
eration. We found that, while the burden of the feed-in tariff per total output amounts to 0.5 
cent per kilowatt hour, the consumer price is impacted only to a minor extend, i.e. plus 0.1 
Eurocent per kilowatt hour, compared to the significant decrease in producer price of about 
0.4 Eurocent per kilowatt hour. The producer price effect introduced by the feed-in can be 
separated into a substitution and a permit price effect of roughly equal size, i.e. -0.2 Eurocent 
per kilowatt hour, which emphasizes the importance of feed backs from the emission market. 
These feed backs also lead to a reduced impact on emissions in the electricity sector. While 
under constant emission prices, the emissions from the German electricity sector are reduced 
by about 48 mega tonnes of CO2 due to the substitution of conventional energy, the permit 
price effect increases the German electricity market emissions by roughly 15 mega tonnes of 
CO2 such that the total sectoral reduction in Germany amounts only to 34 mega tonnes of 
CO2. Moreover, if we consider the whole European electricity sector emission, we find an 
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insignificant decrease in emissions. Of course, the total emissions of the whole ETS sectors 
are not affected, which renders the renewable support ineffective regarding emission reduc-
tion if the overall emission cap is not adjusted. Finally we investigated the effects of the feed-
in on the profits of firms and found a ambiguous effect. Two characteristics of the firms are 
crucial: the physical connection with the German market and the emission intensity. While the 
unambiguously negative substitution effect does not apply to firms that are not directly con-
nected with the German electricity grid, the permit price effect is determined by the firms 
emission intensity. We find that firms that are only loosely connected with the German grid 
and have high emissions are likely to benefit from the German feed-in tariff. At the same 
time, firms with low emissions on or close to the German market suffer losses. 
In light of the discussion in the literature, we cannot confirm a theoretically possible decrease 
in consumer prices by renewable energy support, even though the increase of German con-
sumer prices is only of minor size. Moreover, in regard to effects on emissions, our findings 
are in line with the treatment of Mordhorst (2003) insofar as renewable energy induced emis-
sion reductions in one country will, in part, be compensated by increases in other countries. A 
concerted policy might, therefore, be suggested. In order to assess the problem of a optimal 
concerted action of emission policy and renewable support, the cost structure of the renewable 
energy sources has to be considered in future research. 
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Appendix 
Appendix: Notation 
I   Set of firms 
R   Set of regions 
( )
r r Q P   Inverse demand for electricity in country r  
r P 0   Consumer price of electricity in country r  in the base period 
r
S P   Producer price of electricity in country r  
σ   Emission permit price 
r Q   Electricity consumption in country r  
r Q0   Electricity consumption in country r  in the base period 
() σ E   Total emissions of the electricity sector 
() σ
nely E   Total emissions of the non electricity sector 
* ,r r Ex   Export from country r  to  * r  
i y   Electricity production of firm i 
r Q   Total electricity supply in country r  
r i s
,   Electricity supply of firm   in country  i r  
r S   Total electricity supply of firms in country r  
r Z   Renewable electricity production in country r  
r ς   Feed-in tariff in country r  
( )
i i y C   Marginal costs of electricity production of firm i with costs  ( )
i i y C   
( )
i i y E   Marginal emissions of electricity production of firm    i
i y   Capacity restriction of power plants of firm i 
* ,r r
Ex   Transmission restriction from country r  to  * r  
i κ   Shadow price of capacity restriction of installed power plants of firm i in country r  
* ,r r τ   Shadow price of transmission capacity from country r  to  * r  
r ∈   Residual demand elasticity    
r i, ϑ   Market share of firm   in country  i r  
i l   Binary variable representing different behavioral assumptions with regard to firm    i
i i b a ,  Axis intercept and slope parameter of the marginal cost function of firm i 
i i g f ,  Axis intercept and slope parameter of the marginal emission function of firm    i
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